By Dr. Easir Arafat Khan

Member, IEB Investigation Committee on BM Depot Fire

A National Tragedy Rooted in Engineering Oversight

On the night of 4 June 2022, a devastating fire and explosion occurred at the BM Container Depot, Sitakunda, Chattogram — one of the country’s largest inland container depots.
The tragedy resulted in the death of 49 people, including 11 firefighters, and injuries to hundreds.

Following the event, the Institute of Engineers, Bangladesh (IEB) formed a six-member technical committee to investigate the causes, assess the failures, and recommend corrective actions.
Their report, finalized on 25 June 2022, provides a sobering technical analysis of how poor design, inadequate risk management, and non-compliance with established engineering codes converged to create one of the most severe industrial accidents in Bangladesh’s history.

Sequence of Events: From Fire to Catastrophic Explosion

At approximately 9:00 PM, a fire started in one of several containers storing hydrogen peroxide (H₂O₂) intended for export.
Within half an hour, flames spread rapidly through adjacent containers holding plastic goods, garments, and other combustible materials.
By 10:30 PM, a massive explosion occurred — the result of a violent chemical reaction between concentrated hydrogen peroxide and combustible matter.

The explosion propagated a shockwave equivalent to 150–200 kg TNT, destroying structures within 30 meters, distorting steel frames up to 100 meters away, and causing partial collapse of surrounding facilities.

Investigators concluded that the event was a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) — a pressure-driven blast resulting from the rapid decomposition of hydrogen peroxide under heat confinement.

Technical Cause: The Role of Hydrogen Peroxide and Poor Hazard Control

The IEB report identified hydrogen peroxide (50–60% aqueous solution) as the main reactive agent.
The facility stored 37 containers of this material (approx. 1.7 tonnes per container) without any segregation, special ventilation, or cooling systems.

According to the IMDG Code 2018, such oxidizing substances (Class 5.1, UN 2014) must be stored away from combustible or organic materials, and protected from heat sources.
However, the depot placed peroxide containers adjacent to polymer products — a direct violation of oxidizer-handling protocols.

The decomposition reaction,

H2O2→H2O+½O2+Heat(ΔH=–2884.5kJ/kg)

produces both oxygen and heat, making the system self-accelerating. Once initiated by contamination, confinement, or elevated temperature, this reaction can rapidly escalate to explosion.

Hazard Communication and Emergency Response Gaps

When the first responders from the Fire Service and Civil Defense (FSCD) arrived, they had no access to the depot’s chemical inventory or layout.
The depot failed to maintain a container registry or hazard labeling or failed communicate hazard properly, leaving firefighters unaware that hydrogen peroxide was involved. This lack of information and training directly contributed to the secondary explosion, killing multiple responders on site.

The report emphasized that no Emergency Response Plan (ERP) or incident command system was in place, nor were there chemical-specific firefighting resources such as foam or dry agents.

Engineering and Regulatory Deficiencies

The IEB committee’s analysis highlighted several structural and procedural shortcomings:

• Absence of Chemical Inventory – The depot lacked any system to identify or locate hazardous containers.

• No Risk Assessment or Hazard Zoning – Incompatible materials were stored side by side.

• Lack of Fire Safety Infrastructure – No automatic detection or suppression system existed.

• Non-Compliance with CPA Guidelines (2016) – The facility did not meet even the minimal port authority fire standards.

• No Worker or Firefighter Training on Chemical Hazards – Personnel were unprepared for oxidizer-related incidents.

• Deficient Oversight Mechanisms – The regulatory authorities had no active inspection or verification system for hazardous cargo handling.

These cumulative failures transformed a localized fire into a multi-fatality industrial disaster.

Lessons Learned

The Sitakunda accident provided crucial technical and managerial lessons that must guide future safety reforms:

• Recognize hydrogen peroxide as a high-risk oxidizer, requiring specialized handling and strict segregation.

• Develop and maintain real-time digital inventories of all hazardous goods in storage and transit.

• Integrate Fire Service access to depot databases for immediate hazard identification.

• Ensure compatibility-based zoning within container yards following IMDG and BNBC (2020 Part 4) standards.

• Mandate hazard communication through labeling, placards, and Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS).

• Institutionalize chemical fire training for both depot workers and first responders.

• Establish structured emergency procedures, including evacuation routes, foam deployment systems, and coordination with local authorities.

Recommendations: Building a Safer Industrial Future

The IEB report concludes with a series of strategic and engineering recommendations:

1. For Container Depots and Industries

   • Prepare comprehensive fire and explosion safety manuals specific to stored chemicals.

   • Implement container-level digital registration and mapping.

   • Maintain in-house firefighting teams trained for chemical incidents.

   • Introduce automatic fire detection and suppression systems in all high-risk zones.

2. For Fire Service and Civil Defense

   • Establish hazard communication channels with all bonded and container facilities.

   • Train responders in chemical firefighting protocols and oxidizer-specific tactics.

3. For the Chattogram Port Authority and Regulators

   • Update and enforce the Dangerous Goods Handling Guidelines (2016) in full alignment with IMDG 2018.

   • Require third-party safety audits and annual chemical risk assessments.

   • Integrate Emergency Management and Safety Certification (EMSC) as a licensing prerequisite.

4. For National Implementation

   • Create a National Chemical Safety Authority (NCSA) to oversee chemical storage, transport, and emergency planning.

   • Establish a central hazardous materials database accessible to enforcement and emergency agencies.

   • Incorporate fire and explosion modeling in design and Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA).

A Call for Engineering Accountability

The BM Depot explosion was not a random tragedy — it was a failure of design, discipline, and duty.
The IEB investigation made it clear: every element of the system — technical, managerial, and regulatory — failed to anticipate and prevent the predictable.

To honor those who lost their lives, Bangladesh must institutionalize process safety engineering, enforce risk-based regulation, and cultivate a culture of prevention over reaction.
Without such systemic reform, the same pattern of oversight and loss will recur — only at a different site, with different names.

Dr. Easir Arafat Khan
Professor, Department of Chemical Engineering, BUET
Member, IEB Investigation Committee on BM Container Depot Fire and Explosion (2022)
Specialist in Process Safety, Fire Prevention, and Chemical Risk Management